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DEFINITIONS
CREW - The term "crew" refers to both ground and flight personnel.
ENERGY RELEASE MECHANISM - Any unsafe condition or act that
may couple the energy to a sensitive component, or that could cause
unintentional or uncontrolled energy release.
ENERGY NEEDS - Refers to physical energy needs for warning, escape,
motion control, information, command, interface capability; and phy-
siological energy needs for human survival and human capability.
ENERGY BLOCKAGE MECHANISM - Means by which the loss of the
normal energy supply or excessive energy demands could cause an
unsafe (hazardous) condition, or means by which energy supply may
be lost or demands may exceed capability
ENERGY SOURCES - Refers to high energy environments, both natural
and induced, such as lightning, wind acceleration, vibration; high
energy components, such as pressure vessels, fuels; and low energy
phenomena, such as human toxicants, materials deterioration, physical
contamination.
FAILURE, PRIMARY - This term refers to failure of a component that
was operated in normal sequence within the environmental and time
requirements for which it was designed.
FAILURE, SECONDARY - Failure of a component due to out-of-toler-
ance input from an upstream component or from exposure to an abnor-
mal environment.
FAILURE, SEQUENTIAL - Failure of a component or system due to
receiving input signals out-of-sequence.
HAZARD - Any real or potential condition that can cause injury or
death to personnel, or damage to or loss of equipment or property.
Hazards include: dangerous energy sources and unsafe conditions or
unsafe acts that could lead to accidental energy release; lack of needed
physical or physiological energy for life support.
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HAZARD LEVELS - Hazards are categorized to establish corrective action
prioritie s.
Category I,. Catastrophic. The potential hazard could cause death
or severe injury to personnel, or significant property loss (more than
$100, 000) and there is not time for corrective action.
Category II. Critical. The potential hazard could cause personnel
injury or major property damage (more than $10, 000), and will require
immediate corrective action for personnel or system survival.
Category III. Controlled. Caution, warning and protective devices
are provided so that the potential hazard can be counteracted or controlled
without injury to personnel or major system damage.
Category IV. Negligible. Equipment failures or personnel errors that
will not result in personnel injury or major property loss.
PROGRAM/PROJECT HAZARD SUMMARY - A document summarizing iden-
tified hazards, corrective action, hazard status and risk acceptance rationale
for use in risk management
RISK - Probability of occurrence of a specific hazard and hazard level.
RISK MANAGEMENT - The process whereby decisions are made to
accept a known risk/hazard or to eliminate or minimize the risk/hazard.
Trade-offs are made among increased cost, schedule requirements, and
effectiveness of redesign, installation of safety or warning devices,
and procedural changes to eliminate the risk/hazard.
SAFETY - Freedom from those conditions that can cause injury or
death to personnel and/or damage to or loss of equipment or property.
SAFETY GOALS - Reduce severity and probability of occurrence of
each identified hazard to an acceptable level (controlled).
SYSTEM SAFETY - The optimum degree of safety within the constraints
of operational effectiveness, time and cost, attained through specific
application of system safety management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a system's life cycle.
UNDESIRED EVENT - An event which the system being analyzed cannot
tolerate, such as a catastrophic loss of that system's equipment or loss
of the crew.
viii
PART 1: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
The project manager must plan a safety program that will include
the identification and elimination or control of hazards in ground and
flight equipment and operations. In a few instances, certain known risks
may have to be taken. The acceptance of these risks or residual hazards,
should be based on thorough visibility as to the nature of the hazards and
risks and of the options and alternatives to their acceptance.
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This section summarizes for the project manager those prelimin-
ary and subsequent safety activities that must be accomplished in order
to:
1. Identify hazards in the system
2. Determine corrective actions that may be implemented to
either eliminate or control the hazard.
3. Decide whether to accept a risk. This activity requires that
the System Safety Analyst integrate the findings of safety analyses
with those of other engineeri ng analyses such as sneak circuit
analyses, thermal analyses, stress analyses, etc., which
indicate system hazards, into Risk Management.
The project manager will consider available funds, his need for
systems safety visibility, and criticality of the mission prior to deciding
upon the required level of safety analysis effort.
C. ORGANIZATION
As a general rule, to maintain objectivity and a check and balance
system, it is preferable that system safety not be part of nor subordinate
to the design engineering organization. System safety should, however,
be an active participant in design and development activities. Regardless
of organizational structure, system safety analyses must be performed by
personnel who have an intimate knowledge of the system, crew interfaces
and mission operations.
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D. PRELIMINARY SAFETY ACTIVITIES
Planning for the safety effort will include a Functional Hazard
Analysis and related tasks. These tasks, which become the foundation
for system safety efforts during system definition, design, manufacture,
test and operation, are:
1. Review of pertinent historical safety data from similar systems.
2. Development of safety guidelines and constraints based on mission
objectives and experience from previous programs. These will
guide the considerations of various concepts for meeting the
objectives.
30 Continuing review of the gross hardware requirements,
concepts and documentation as the program/project develops.
4. Review of the proposed rhission objectives for safety con-
siderations.
5. Performance of a functional hazard analysis to identify
potentially hazardous functions and system elements,
undesired events, and to -develop initial safety require-
ments and criteria.
6, Performance of trade studies with the result of the functional
hazard analysis identifying highly hazardous areas, with
recommendations for elimination or control of the hazard or
of possible alternatives.
7, Identification of requirements for special safety studies.
These should normally be required during system definition
or preliminary design in order to be cost effective.
8o Estimation of resource requirements for system safety
analysis during the complete system life cycle.
9. Establishment of a system for retaining the following safety
data developed during the program life cycle: results of
analysis, safety criteria and requirements, results of special
studies and applicable historical data, risk decisions and
rationale.
10- Establishment of a system safety output schedule to coincide
with major program/project milestones to assure timely
and effective application of safety principles in the solution
of major problems.
E. SUBSEOUENT SAFETY ACTIVITIES
Detailed safety analyses are conducted by formalized techniques
which are identified as Fault Hazard Analysis, Procedures Analysis,
and Human Factors Analysis. These analysis techniques, described in
Part II of this guide, are intended to provide systematic determination
of:
1. Undesired events
2. Safety criteria and requirements
3. Extent to which safety criteria and requirements have been
included in the design
4. Whether safety criteria and requirements created for
a specific design have provided adequate safety for the system
5. Means for meeting pre-established safety goals
6. Means for demonstrating that safety goals have been met
7. Factors that may cause secondary component failures
8. Factors that may cause sequential failures
9. Need for further analyses
10. Critical fault paths
11. Critical components
12. Procedural discrepancies
13. Corrective action to reduce hazards
14. Factors contributing to hazardous human errors
15. Hazardous failure occurrence
16. Potential effect of hazard upon crew
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F. RISK MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
The process of risk management involves the evaluation of hazards
identified by the safety analyses to determine appropriate actions required:
To control the hazard or to accept the risk involved. The control may
consist of such actions as a design change, addition of safety devices,
development of caution and warning capabilities, or changes in procedures.
Acceptance of risk is a decision in which impacts on cost, schedule, or
performance outweigh the risk of occurrence of the hazard.
Risk management iterates as the program matures and as the
requirements/specifications develop in depth and coverage. The itera-
tive process and the need for data recall require that the decisions made
within the responsibilities of risk management be completely documented
together with the analytical data, safety requirements generation, decision
rationale, impact versus risk evaluations and directed corrective action.
These data comprise the Program Hazard Summary.
Figure 1 depicts and summarizes the risk management concept
and the Program Hazard Summary relations.
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HAZARDS
FMEA IDENTIFIED PROGRAM
SAFETY ANALYSES EVALUATED
FUNCTIONAL TRADE STUDIES DECISIONS
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SNEAK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PRODUCTION
PROCEDURES RATIONALE MANUFACTURING PLANS
SSUPPORT AND USE
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
BASELINE CONFIGURATION
DATA R
DRAWINGS
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FIGURE 1. RISK MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
PART II: TECHNICAL METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
The formalization of the system safety analyses in the development
programs of MSFC requires technical methods that are generally accepted
as tools of the system safety technology. Data utilized as a basis for con-
ducting these analyses consists of specifications, system descriptions, flow
diagrams,engineering drawings and related data° Section C summarizes
four of these methods: Sections D, E, F, and G describe themo
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. Part II describes in broad terms the technical system safety
methods that are available for accQmplishing risk evaluation. This evalua-
tion will serve as a basis for a decision to accept the risk or require a
design concept, design or procedural changeo The evaluation methods are
described in sufficient detail to provide an understanding of the techniques
and permit an evaluation of the analysis results. For additional informa-
tion refer to systems safety and hazard analysis publications listed in
Appendix A. -
2. The methods described herein are applicable to all MSFC
systems. The analysis methods may be expanded, reduced or altered as
required to suit the specific needs of any project, thus assuring maximum
flexibility.
3. The major reasons for undertaking system safety analyses
are to:
a. Identify hazards in a system so they can be eliminated,
controlled or minimized
b. Categorize the hazards in terms of
(1) Relative severity of the hazard, which is the effect
on the system should the hazardous event occur.
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(2) Mission phase during which the hazardous event
can affect the system.
(3) Likelihood of hazardous event occurrence.
c. Develop recommendations for corrective actions.
d. Evaluate corrective action taken by a designer to
eliminate or control identified hazards.
e. Systematically search for alternatives to acceptance of
risks during testing or operation of the system.
f. Develop a continuing Project Hazard Summary utilizing
all sources of information pertinent to the life cycle of
the system. These sources will include system analyses,
sneak circuit analysis thermal analyses, stress analyses
and other engineering analyses which will aid in identifying
system hazards. This summary identifies the hazard, and
control action, residual hazard, and risk acceptance for
Risk Management. (See Section F of Part I.)
C. TECHNIQUES FOR SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS
Four system safety analytical methods, see Figure 2, are described
in their logical order of progression. The amount of progression, and
extent and depth of analytical coverage is determined by project manage-
ment based on its need for safety visibility.
1. Functional Hazard Analysis
This analysis identifies hazards associated with major
mission events and energy sources. It is a non-detailed preliminary
analysis usually associated with the early phases of a project. This
analysis identifies gross areas of concern in mission and system con-
cepts, and recommends specific areas for further analysis in subse-
quent safety activity. An activity associated with Functional Hazard
Analysis is the identification or development of system safety require-
ments and review of requirements and safety standards for. applicability
with respect to project characteristics. See Section D for description.
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FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
Identify Undesired Events
Broad Hazard Areas
Areas to Receive Further Evaluation
Identify Undesired
FAULT HAZARD ANALYSIS Events and Critical
(FMEA ADD-ON AND LOGIC DIAGRAM ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES) Components
Identify 1 Identify Critical
Factors Components FMEA----
Contributing
to
Human Errors
That Could PROCEDURES ANALYSIS
Lead to
Undesired
rvents Identify Factors Contributing to
Human Errors that Could Lead to
_ _ 
_ _Out of Sequence Operations
HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
FIGURE 2. SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS METHODS AND RELATIONSHIPS
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2. Fault Hazard Analysis
As the system becomes better defined and more detailed
design data evolve, Fault Hazard Analysis can be undertaken. This
analysis can be accomplished by the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) Add-On or the Logic Diagram Analysis (LDA) technique. See
Section E for description.
3. Procedures Analysis
Manufacturing, testing, checkout, training and operating
procedures should be analyzed to assure safety of the system and of the
human operators. See Section F for a further discussion.
4. Human Factors Analysis
Human Factors considerations are an adjunct to the fore-
going analyses to assure incorporation of the Human Element in evalua-
tions. Human Factor considerations will be incorporated into Fault
Hazard Analyses concurrent with the system concept and shall be refined
as Ground/Flight crew responsibilities and procedures become definitive
with respect to test, operations, maintenance,etc. See Section G for a
further discussion.
D. FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
1. General
a. The purpose of the Functional Hazard Analysis, the
first analysis in the progression, is to identify safety critical areas and
hazards to be resolved during feasibility studies or system definition
activities. This analysis provides a comprehensive identification of
hazards commensurate with generic system definition and is accomplished
as early in the program as possible.
b. Information required to do this analysis falls in two
categories:
(1) safety data (e.g., checklists, design guides,
general failure data) from previous pertinent
programs
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(2) systern and subsystem descriptions of systems
being analyzed,
c. A portion of the Human Factors Analysis (see Section G)
will be done as a step in the Functibnal Hazard Analysis where considera-
tion is given to factors which could induce human errors that might cause
undesired events. The results of the Functional Hazard Analysis will be
used as a starting point for Fault Hazard, Procedures and Human Factors
Analyse s.
2. Method of Analysis
a. The Functional Hazard Analysis will:
(1) Review pertinent NASA experience and data pro-
duced by other agencies to take advantage of
previous similar safety experience. This safety
data, e. g., standard checklists, design guides,
and failure experience will be tailored to more
nearly match the mission and system characteris-
tics of interest,
(2) Review System Design data related to the evolving
system.
(3) Identify all energy sources and energy needs such
as:
(a) High Energy Environment
(b) High Energy Components
(c) Low Energy Phenomena
(d) Physical Energy Needs
(e) Physiological Energy needs
(4) Identify design features or procedures that have
been developed to control energy release
mechanism or energy blockage mechanism.
(5) Identify energy release mechanism or energy
blockage mechanism for which inadequate controls
have been adopted.
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(6) Identify safety requirements and criteria incor-
porated or needed to assure control of the energy
release mechanism or energy blockage
mechanisms.
(7) Reiterate the process in those areas where
major program changes occur.
(8) Use results of the analysis as applicable for an
input to trade studies and reviews.
b. In performing a Functional Hazard Analysis the analyst
will prepare a chronological listing of functions or events. He will then
relate these functions and events to the systems operating during these
events. An example listing of mission functions or events with functional
systems to perform those functions on manned space vehicles is presented
in Figure 3.
c. The next step in the Functional Hazard Analysis is to
identify energy sources/needs and related hazards which are applicable
to each of the defined functional systems. The energy source/need and
hazard identifications are largely based on data and experience from
previous programs and/or system functional diagrams. Figure 4 pre-
sents hazards for only one of the mission events. It shows undesired
events and their causes for the functional systems defined for a launch-
boost phase. Safety features and evaluation for adequacy of control of
the hazardous events are then reviewed to identify areas needing further
consideration.
d. A further step in the Functional Hazard Analysis is to
consider factors which could induce human errors that might cause unde-
sired events. For information on human error analysis (e. g., factors
and limits) see Section G.
3. Re sults
This analysis will give the preliminary identification of the
following items, which can be presented in Figure 4 format:
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MISSION EVENTS FUNCTIONAL SYST EMS
PRE-LAUNCH Engines, Flight Control,
Fuel, Oxidizer, Staging,
Guidance, Electrical,
Propellant Dispersion,
Telemetry, Launch Escape
System, Structures
LAUNCH-BOOST Engines, Flight Control,
Fuel, Oxidizer, Staging,
Guidance, Electrical,
Propellant Dispersion,
Telemetry, Launch Escape
System, Structures
FAIRING SEPARATION Separation, Electrical,
Structures, Ordnance
ORBITAL INJECTION Engine Shutdown, Payload
Separation, Electrical,
Guidance, Structures, Mechanical
SOLAR PANEL DEPLOYMENT Squib, Unfolding, Electrical,
Navigation, Structures
ATTITUDE POSITIONING Reaction Control, Electrical,
Navigation, Mechanical
ORBIT CORRECTION Propulsion, Computer, Elec-
trical, Navigation
DATA ACQUISITION Antenna, Telemetry, Computer,
Electrical
MID-COURSE CORRECTION Propulsion, Computer, Navigation,
Electrical
STAR ACQUISITION Navigation, Reaction Control,
Computer, Electrical
DATA ACQUISITION AND Sensing, Data Storage, Teleme-
TRANSMISSION try, Electrical
FIGURE 3. TYPICAL MANNED MISSION EVENTS AND
FUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS
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PROJECT FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS SHEET NO. of
MISSION EVENT LAUNCH - BOOST DATE
FUNCTIONAL ENERGY HAZARD UNDESIRED HAZARD RECOMMENDED) REMARKS
SYSTEM SOURCE/NEED EVENTS CATEGORY SAFETY ACTION
ENGINES High pressure Loss of one Loss of total
lines, valves, engine thrust, stage thrust -
thrust chamber engine explosion vehicle loss
FLIGHT High pressure Hydraulic actua- Loss of thrust
CONTROL pump, valves & tor leak or sei- vectoring -
lines zure, erroneous vehicle loss
signal.
FUEL High pressure Pressure switch Engine shutdown
lines fails to actuate, vehicle loss
fuel leak
OXIDIZER High pressure Lox leak Engine shutdown
lines
STAGING Solid fuel Motor case Loss of staging-
(Rocket) rupture vehicle loss
GUIDANCE Guidance Receiver or Loss of flight
signal need transmitter control, guidance
malfunction vehicle loss
ELECTRICAL Voltage and Open circuit, Loss of flight
current source short circuit control, guidance
or need source, or con- vehicle loss
trol malfunction
PROPELLANT Ordnance Inadvertent Loss of thrust-
DISPERSION actuation vehicle loss
TELEMETRY Signal need Sensor malfunc- Loss of parame-
tion ter monitoring-
degradation
Power/signal Transmitter mal Loss of space
need function vehicle status
monitoring-loss
of mission
FIGURE 4. FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
a. Functional System
The systems required to perform the functions necessary
to meet the program objectives are called functional sys-
tems and will contain hazardous elements, such as;
energy sources or energy needs,
b, Energy Source/Need
An energy source (such as; pressurized tanks or lines)
is a hazardous element from which uncontrolled energy
release could cause personnel injury or equipment
damage. An energy need is a hazardous element
necessary for safe completion of a mission; such as;
emergency signal generator or oxygen for life support.
c0  Hazard
The energy release mechanism (such as; high pressure
lox leak or motor case rupture) which would cause an
uncontrolled energy release is one class of hazard.
Another class is the energy need blockage mechanism,
such as; signal relay failure or life support oxygen
control valve failure,
d. Undesired Event
If a hazard occurs, the result could be one or more
undesired events, such as; loss of stage thrust, loss
of vehicle or loss of oxygen,
e. Hazard Category
These categories are defined on page v above.
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f. Recommended Safety Action
Recommendations and comments are
developed to identify proposed actions to
eliminate or control the identified hazards.
g. Remarks
Comments are included to identify the need
for residual hazard evaluations.
The results of the Functional Hazard Analysis are compiled for
inclusion in the Program/Project Hazard Summary.
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E. FAULT HAZARD ANALYSIS
1. General
a. The purpose of the Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA), the
second analysis in the progression, after further system definition, is to
identify component conditions, human factors and procedural discrepancies
which could lead to undesired events. These identified components should
be the first ones analyzed by Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). In
the event that FMEA's are completed first, the results of the FMEA analy-
sis will be used as input to Fault Hazard Analysis. The Fault Hazard Analy-
sis and FMEA can, however, be conducted independently of each other.
b. Fault Hazard Analysis, accomplished by means of the
FMEA Add-On (FAO) and Logic Diagram Analysis (LDA) techniques, is
explained in paragraphs 2 a and 2bo The systems analyst must have the
same information and knowledge to perform an FHA by the FAO as by
the LDA technique. The primary difference is in the starting point and
in the method of presenting the final results. The FAO starts with each
component to be analyzed and considers upstream and other component
failures and human factors which could affect the subject component,
The LDA starts with the '"undesired event" and works back toward
possible causes. The final result of the FAO is a table of component
failure causes which supplements the FMEA whereas the final result
of the LDA is a series of logic diagrams showing undesired events and
possible human factor,procedural discrepancies and component failure
causes.of the undesired events. (See Figure 5).
co Types of information used in performing Fault Hazard
Analysis are:
(1) Functional Hazard Analysis results.
(2) System requirements
(3) Drawings
(4) Specifications
(5) Hardware system descriptions
(6) Mission time lines
(7) Historical data on similar systems and components
(8) Test data
(9) FMEA's
FMEA ADD-ON FMEA
COMPONENT FAILURE FAILURE EFFECT ON
MODES SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM
THE FMEA DETERMINES THE
EFFECT OF SINGLE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODES ON SUBSYSTEMS
THE FA DETERMINES THE AND SYSTEMS.
UPSTREAM CAUSES OF COMPONENT
FAILURE MODES WHICH ARE THE
STARTING POINT OF AN FMEA. ,
TYPICAL CAUSES WOULD BE SINGLE, c
MULTIPLE OR SEQUENTIAL <
FAILURES AND HUMAN FACTORS. \4
LOGIC DIAGRAM ANALYSIS
THE LDA STARTS WITH UNDESIRED EVENTS(NOT LIMITED
TO THOSE IN THE FMEA)AND IDENTIFIES SINGLE,
MULTIPLE, AND SEQUENTIAL FAILURES AND HUMAN FACTORS
THAT CAN CAUSE UNDESIRED EVENTS.
FIGURE 5. FMEA ADD-ON, FMEA, LDA RELATIONSHIP
d. Logic Diagram Analysis starts with undesired events
identified in the Functional Hazard Analysis and FMEA. Human factors
discussed in Section G must be considered when determining possible
causes which lead to undesired events.
2. Methods
a. FMEA Add-On Technique
This technique builds on the FMEA through further
system engineering analyses. (See format in Figure 6).
(1) An analysis is made to determine what combina-
tion of failure conditions existing simultaneously could result in an unde-
sired event. An example of this type of occurrence would be, as shown
in Figure 7, "power remains on pressure switch contacts when switch
fails closed "and" pressure switch contacts fail to open after tank pre-
surized. " This combination of failures would result in "relay not de-
energized after tank pressurized". This information would be listed
in column (2) of Figure 6.
(2) An analysis is made to identify conditions which
could lead to human errors that might result in an undesired event. The
conditions identified might directly effect the component being analyzed
or may effect the sequence, duration, or magnitude of upstream input
signals or loads to the component being analyzed. If the condition affects
the component directly, the conditions will be described in column 3;
if the effect results in secondary or sequential failure of the component
this information will be entered in column 4 or 5 as appropriate.
(3) A determination is made regarding which
failures upstream from each component being analyzed could result in
an undesired event. An example would be a fluid or gas pressure above
or below that for which the component was designed to operate. An
abnormally high pressure could result in secondary structural failure
of the component being analyzed, whereas too low a pressure could
result in failure of the system to operate properly. Upstream failures
that can cause out-of-tolerance conditions effecting components being
analyzed should be listed in column 4 of Figure 6.
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FMEA ADD-ON TECHNIQUE
Component ultiple Failures Human Factors Factors That May Factors That MayComponentIdentification That May Cause That May Cause Cause Component Cause Component Remarks
Component Failure Component Failure Secondary Failure Sequential Failure
1 2 3 4 5 6
FIGURE 6. FAULT HAZARD ANALYSIS, FMEA ADD-ON
(4) An additional analysis is made regarding the possi-
ble ways in which failures of upstream components could result in an opera-
tional sequence failure due to premature or delayed input signals to the
component being analyzed. Sequentially improper outputs of upstream
components should be identified and listed in column 5 of Figure 6. These
upstream component failures are responsible for "premature"or delayed''
operation failure modes for components analyzed in the FMEA,
b. Logic Diagram Analysis Technique
A sample logic diagram, Figure 7, is a top-down graphic
representation of the various parallel and series combinations of subsys-
tem failures which can result in an undesired event, The accomplishment
of a Logic Diagram Analysis is undertaken in the following series of steps:
(1) Identify undesired events from Functional Hazard
Analysis or checklists from other programs.
(2) Develop the logic diagram by determining the
parallel and series events which may cause the undesired events to occur.
This process is continued through the appropriate system, subsystem, com-
ponent, or piece-part level in order to satisfy the scope of analysis pre-
viously approved. The series and parallel events are connected by use of
graphic symbols. The process of constructing a logic diagram is described
in NASA Safety Manual NHB 1700. 1 (V3), Boeing Document D2-113072-2 Fault
Tree Analysis and Electronic Industries Association Safety Engineering
Bulletin No. 3.
(3) Identify critical fault paths (those chains of events
which are the most likely to result in a particular undesired event or
potential accident). There may be several chains of various degrees of
dominance. These chains and their associated degrees of dominance
are most clearly identified in the system safety model (logic diagram).
The system safety analyst will determine critical fault path(s) and their
relative degree of dominance.
(4) Concentrate the initial corrective action on the
most critical fault path since this is the most likely avenue along which
the undesired event can occur. It may be necessary, however, to con-
sider other paths within the model for the occurrence of a particular
undesired event or potential accident.
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The CIRCLE identifies a component PRIMARY
Output FAILURE.
The component failed in spite of being properly
designed and operated within the design require-
ments for environment and electrical, hydraulic,
mechanical or other input. This may be a com-
ponent which had a manufacturing defect that was
Output not detected by quality control or test verification.
The RECTANGLE identifies an EVENT that results
from a combination of fault events.
Input OR/AND Gate
Output
The DIAMOND identifies a failure which has not
been fully developed due to lack of sufficient infor-
mationo
Output
The OR GATE describes the logical operation
whereby the output is caused by.the occurrence
SInputs of any of the inputso
Inpuutputts
utput The AND GATE describes the logical operation
which requires the coexistence of all inputs to
Inputs cause the output.
FIGURE 8. LOGIC DIAGRAM SYMBOLS
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(5) Assure that the system safety model (logic diagram)
for a given undesired event or potential accident has been developed to
the extent necessary to identify critical fault paths. As a minimum the
logic diagram development must consider all the safety features and
devices which have been designed into the system. This assures that
adequate consideration has been given to those areas of the system which
contain the greatest identified risk. Safety features and devices are
normally placed where theee exists the greatest risk of undesired event
occurrence
(6) Deterine.by logical inspection, the degree of
dominance for those critical fault paths of the model which contribute
the most to the risk. Logical inspection is the logical thought process
of a trained and experienced analyst being applied through examination
of the model. This process, associated with whatever experience fac-
tors he may consider during the examination to determine which events
'"look to be" more probable than others, would lead to the resulting
statement by the analyst: "these events (identified) and critical fault
path(s) look to be the most probable. " (See Figure,9). Since the pur-
pose of the evaluation of a diagram is to evaluate the critical fault paths
and establish their relative significance, the diagram must be simplified
by inspection to minimize the logic diagram structure to be evaluated.
This inspection results in elimination of those events and branches which
are obviously insignificant compared to others.
c. Comparison of the Logic Diagram Analysis with the
FMEA
The Logic Diagram Analysis considers single and
multiple failures (occurring simultaneously or in sequence) and human
errors. This analysis considers failures that will lead to equipment
and/or crew loss. The FMEA generally considers single failure points
that lead to crew, equipment, and/or mission loss; it does not consider
human errors or multiple failures. MSFC document 85M03885 presents
a typical detailed discussion of how to perform a Failure Mode, Effect
and Criticality Analysis. See Figure 10 for a comparison of FMEA and
Fault Hazard Analysis conducted by LDA.
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Failure Loss,
Analysis Error Single Multiple Sequential Human Mission Crew Equipment
TechnFailure Failures Failures Errors Loss Injury LossPoints Or Loss
FAULT
HAZARD
ANALYSIS (FHA) X X X * X
FAILURE MODE &
EFFECT ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
*Equipment loss that results in crew injury or death
FIGURE 10 FMEA AND.FHA COMPARISON
?-5
Figure 11 represents the relationship between the LDA
and the FMEA. Either the LDA or the FMEA could be the first analysis
prepared. In the case where the LDA is the first analysis prepared,
certain components (A and B on figure 11) are identified whose failure
could lead to an undesired event. These same components should be
analyzed further during the preparation of the FMEA. If the FMEA is
prepared first, the undesired events identified in the FMEA ("Failure
Effect on" section in Figure 11) are then analyzed by the LDA to deter-
mine if human errors or multiple failures (not considered by the FMEA)
could produce the same undesired event.
3. Results
The Fault Hazard Analysis will identify the following causes
of undesired events:
ao Component or-part failures
bo Secondary failures
co Sequential Failures
do Multiple failures
e Inadequate safety features
F. PROCEDURES ANALYSIS
I1 General
ao The purpose of Procedures Analysis, third analysis
in the progression, is to define and recommend incorporation of safety
requirements that should be met to assure safety of the system, ground
crew and flight crew during system operation
bo Data required for the performance of this analysis
include:
(1) Drawings, specifications and hardware (system)
de sc riptions
(2) Test and operational procedures
(3) Manufacturing processes
(4) Mission time lines or test requirements
(5) Results of all safety analyses previously per-
formed
(Cont'd on page 31)
26
UNDESIRED
EVENT
OR
I--"~---------A
Components whose
primary Failures and
lead to undesired
events.
-a 
--- 
-- B
II /
Ii /
I I /
Failure effect on system or
crew is an undesired /event
FMEA Generalized Format III
Failure Effect on /I Component Failure Remarks -
I Identifications Modes Subsystem System Crew Recommendations
I
-) B
FIGURE 11. RELATIONSHIP OF LDA TO FMEA
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FIGURE 12. TYPICAL FMEA FORMAT
Column
Number Entry Description and Explanation
1 Name of the element or component under analysis,
and reference designation used to identify the element
on the schematic.
Also, drawing number by which the contractor identi-
fies and describes each item, and coding designation
used to identify the item on the block diagrams.
2 Concise statement of the function performed.
3 Enter and describe the specific failure mode after
considering the four basic failure conditions:
Premature operation
Failure to operate at a prescribed time
Failure to cease operating at a prescribed time
Failure during operation
4. Estimate of time from failure occurrence to ultimate
failure effect.
5. Operational or mission phase in which the critical
failure occurs. For lower level FMEA's where the
mission phase such as boost, orbit, etc. is unknown,
the system's operational modes should be substituted.
6, 7 A brief description of the effect of the failure on the
functional assembly of which the item being analyzed is
a part and next higher assemblies. For analysis pur-
poses, the effects of a failure on the next higher assem-
blies shall be classified as follows:
FIGURE 12. (EXPLANATION)
29
Column
Number Entry Description and Explanation
Effect Probability of Occurrence P (x)
Actual Loss P(x) = 1. 00
Probable Loss 0o 10<P(x) <- 1o 00
Possible Loss 0<P(x) _ 0, 10
No effect P(x) = 0
8. Describe the effect of the failure on the mission or
operational objective of the end item. See (6,7)
above for effect categories.
9. A description of the effect of the failure on crew or
vehicle safety or both, See (6,7) above for effect
classifications.
10. A description of the methods by which the failure
is detected. If not readily detectable, indicate how
testing or adding of test points would lead to detec-
tion,
11. A description of the recommended corrective actions
that the using personnel or the maintenance crew
could take to circumvent (work around) the failure.
12. State the criticality category,
13. List any pertinent information not included in the other
columns.
FIGURE 12. (EXPLANATION)
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(6) Historical data from previously performed tests
and operations of similar systems.
c. Undesired events and hazardous conditions and elements
identified in the Functional Hazard and Fault Hazard Analyses will be
used as a basis for determining if any procedures or combinations of
procedures could lead to identified hazards. Consideration of the poten-
tial for human error will be an inherent part of this analysis. Factors
described in Section G will serve as guidelines for assessing the potential
for human error in the procedure analysis.
2. Method of Analysis
a. This analysis technique involves a review of all require-
ments, procedures, and actual practices associated with the program.
Emphasis is placed on completeness of procedures, including all cautions
to be exercised regarding inadvertent out-of-sequence operations, and
inclusion in the procedures of adequate recycle and backout instructions
to counter potential emergency situations.
b. The procedures safety analysis is performed in three
steps as follows:
(1) Review test or operations requirements docu-
mentation and develop or review safety requirements appropriate to proce-
dures and recommend inclusion of these requirements into the document.
(2) Review the manufacturing, packaging, handling,
storage, transportation, maintenance, test, operation and emergency
procedures to verify that the safety requirements included in the re-
quirements documentation have been included in the procedures. Special
attention should be devoted to backout and shutdown capability. Manufac-
turing procedures are to be examined to assure that no process will sub-
sequently result in a hazardous condition for the system or its flight crew.
(3) Review developmental, qualification, acceptance,
and system validation testing procedures. Also review test procedures
and actual testing during pre-launch checkout. Reiterate the proce-
dures safety analysis for any major design and procedural changes.
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3. Re s ults
a. Identification of corrective action necessary for
avoiding or reducing hazards and development of justification for these
actions. Possible corrective actions:
(1) Procedural controls to be imposed
(2) Warning and caution notes to be inserted
in operation and maintenance procedures
(3) Emergency procedures to be developed
(4) Testing safety requirements to be specified
(5) Requirements for emergency equipment and
its location to be developed
(6) Safety restrictions and regulations to be imple-
mented
(7) Safety training requirements to be implemented
G. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
1. Gene ral
a. The purpose of the Human Factors Analysis, the fourth
in the progression, is the identification of potential errors in operator
functions, tasks and requirements during test, operation and maintenance.
Human Factors Analysis is presentedinthis Guide as a separate analysis,
in order to define it adequately. However, its main applications are in
conjunction with the other analyses described in this Guide where the
effects of human error must be determined.
b. The data required for this analysis includes that
required for the other analyses and a knowledge of human factors
(listed below) that could lead to errors. Consideration of these factors
should be an inherent part of Functional Hazard Analysis, Fault
Hazard Analysis, and Procedure Analysis0
(1) Inherent task difficulty. can be measured
to a satisfactory degree through accepted laboratory and simulation
techniques, whereby task failure rate under prescribed conditions can be
determined.
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(2) Environmental stress factors include heat, cold,
darkness, noise, acceleration forces including zero gravity, vibration,
extreme fatigue, or prolonged isolation. Simulation techniques have
been helpful in measuring the effects of the physical environment. In
analyzing fatigue and prolonged isolation, it is possible to use rational
judgement of these factors' effect on humans in a given context.
(3) Design features inducing human error are those
"booby traps" such as similar control khobs, located close together, for
different functions. Some can be eliminated by examination, however,
other more subtle examples must be analyzed. Secondary and sequen-
tial failures that can be traced to human errors due to the absence of
good human engineering practices is an example of this.
(4) Task associated with "look alike" items such
as installation of electrical connectors, pneumatic or hydraulic fittings
are major contributors to human errors.
(5) Accessibility/vulnerability concerns the accessi-
bility for human-induced "'accidents" coupled with the vulnerability to
abuse. Access to sensitive equipment and areas must be provided only
to certified or qualified personnel.
(6) Level of personnel skill (relative to a specific
context). This analysis evaluates the training, related experience, oppor-
tunities for practice and learning conditions of the individuals who are
likely to perform a given task.
c. Human Factors Analysis is normally performed in
conjunction with the other analyses as indicated belowo
2. Method of Analysis
a. The basic method for Human Factor Analysis is as
follows:
(1) Define the system (or part) failure.
(2) Identify and list human operations performed
and their relationships to system tasks and
functions.
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(3) Determine human errors which lead to system
failures.
(4) Recommend changes to reduce probability of
system failure.
b. The basic method,as applied in the performance of the
progressive hazard analysis previously described, is to include the
following activities.
(1) Functional HazardAnalysis
(a) Identify those mission and system functions
wherein the human operators play a signi-
ficant role.
(b) Identify the physical environment under
which the human operator must perform
these functions and the resultant hazard.
(c) Evaluate system design and training to
assess its adequacy for supporting the
human function.
(d) Make recommendations for improvement
where inadequacies exist in requirements
for design and training
(2) Fault Hazard Analysis
(a) Identify factors which can contribute to
component secondary and sequential fail-
ures. Specify those factors or hazardous
events which can result from human error.
(b) Make recommendations for improvement
of the system design or of specific proce-
dures to reduce the probability of human
error, See Figure 13 and supporting text
for an example.
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RAPID LOSS
OF ATMOSPHERE
OR
AIRLOCK VENT ENERGIZED
FAILS STRUCTURAL OPEN INADEQUATE DESIGN
OPENFAILURE PREMATURELY
FMEA FMEA HUMAN ERROR
ANALYSIS
SAMPLE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYI
Possible Error
Crew member could press "vent open" control button out of sequence
and thereby erroneously energize and open the vent valve prematurely.
Reasons for Error
The "vent open" control button looks like several other control
buttons.
Recommended Corrective Action
Design an electrical or mechanical interlock which prevents premature
energizing of the vent valve even if the "vent open" control button is
pressed. Change appearance of look-alike control buttons so they can
be readily distinguished from each other.
FIGURE 13. SAMPLE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
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(c) Consider potential human operator reac-
tion to an undesired event and to the sub-
system failures which produce the unde-
sired event. Record these potential acts
in parallel with the subsystem analysis
data.
(d) Examine the potential reactions so identi-
fied and determine if they may produce an
error and further contribute to the hazard-
ous situation.
(e) Evaluate the adequacy of the system design
and training program and make recommenda-
tions to reduce the probability of emer-
gency-induced human error.
(3) Procedures Analysis
(a) Identify the physical environment under
which the human operator must perform
the specified functions.
(b) Evaluate the human engineering aspects
of the system design and the adequacy of
the training program for supporting the
function under the identified conditions of
performance.
(c) Make recommendations for improvement
where inadquacies exist in the system
design and in the training program.
3. Results
Identification of human factors in operator functions, tasks
and requirements during test, operation and maintenance. Recommenda-
tions for procedural, software and hardware changes to eliminate,
minimize or control possible hazards due to human errors.
36
H. REQUIREMENTS VERIFICATION
1. The product of the analytical safety effort consists of safety
visibility used in support of risk management decisions and safety require-
ments used to influence design or procedures that test or operate the sys-
tem. It is necessary not only to establish the initial safety requirements
and criteria, but to evaluate these requirements and criteria on an itera-
tive basis to assure they accomplish the intent for which they were originated.
Moreover, new requirements may be developed or existing requirements
changed in order to maintain the established safety level of the system.
2. Original safety requirements and criteria stem from data
extracted from experience gained on similar systems, standard system
safety technology and the Functional Hazards Analysis. More detailed
safety analyses such as the Fault Hazard Analysis utilizing the Logic
Diagram Analysis technique will yield requirements that are unique to the
evolving system.
3. Concurrently with the performance of these analyses, the
original safety criteria should be assessed to verify that these require-
ments correctly continue to influence the design as it evolves. It is
essential, as these safety requirements are developed or refined, that
they be documented and that this documentation be maintained on an up-
to-date basis for design use.
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